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1 Introduction
Explicit inflation targeting (IT) has been increasingly adopted as a monetary policy strategy
to curb actual inflation over the medium-to-long horizon. Under the IT regime, a central bank
publicly announces a target inflation rate and then uses different monetary policy tools to bridge
the gap between actual inflation and the target. One of the impressive features of this monetary
policy strategy is no country has given up this regime after its adoption. The Reserve Bank of
New Zealand became the first central bank to adopt the IT regime in 1990. The increasing
popularity of the IT regime has spawned a great deal of academic interest in its effectiveness.
Even though the amount of work on the effectiveness of IT has increased manifold in the last
two decades, there is no consensus on the overall impact of this regime on the macroeconomy.
One view suggests a significant effect of IT on macroeconomic performance; the opposite
suggests that the impact of the IT regime has been mostly insignificant. Several researchers
find inflation targeting is successful in reducing inflation and inflation variability (Neumann
and von Hagen (2002), Wu (2004), Vega and Winkelried (2005), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel
(2007), and Creel and Hubert (2010)). Among them, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001)
argue the IT regime not only causes a reduction in inflation and inflation variability, but lessens
the sacrifice ratio, output volatility, and inflation expectations. The literature also postulates
inflation targeting lowers other economic variables such as exchange rate volatility (Rose (2007)
and Lin (2010)),1 interest rates (Filho (2011)), fiscal indiscipline (Minea and Tapsoba (2014)
and Lucotte (2012)), and actual dollarization (Lin and Ye (2013)). However, Johnson (2002)
and Angeriz and Arestis (2007) find the IT regime does not reduce the variability of expected
inflation. Similar viewpoints have been expressed by Ball and Sheridan (2003), who argue
there is no evidence that IT reduces inflation variability, output volatility, and output growth.
Lin and Ye (2007) also find IT has no significant effects on either inflation or inflation variability.
They suggest both targeters and non-targeters have experienced an unexpected reduction in
1Lin (2010) finds inflation targeting lowers real and nominal exchange rate volatility only in industrial
economies, but increases them in developing countries.
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inflation.
Our study contributes to the existing IT impact literature in several ways. Our econometric
approach improves on the treatment effect literature that has been used to estimate the impact
of IT. A few methods have been proposed to take into account the self-selection problem that
may arise because a central bank’s decision to explicitly target inflation is related to the benefits
from the adoption of IT. This leads to a biased causal effect. Previous studies (e.g. Lin and Ye
(2013) and de Mendonca and de Guimaraes (2012)) have attempted to overcome the selection
bias problem by estimating propensity scores and matching treated and control units to mimic
a randomized experiment. The parametric approach to estimating the average treatment effect
of inflation targeting suffers from model misspecification and provides inconsistent estimates of
the propensity scores, when the true data generating process is very different from that based
on a pre-specified functional form of the model. The nonparametric approach proposed by
Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003) could be a possible solution to the issue. The approach,
however, suffers from the “curse of dimensionality,” which refers to the problem where the
high dimension of the variable space due to large number of covariates in their logit series
estimation makes the performance of the nonparametric estimator worse. To take into account
these econometric problems, we estimate propensity scores by the semiparametric single index
method suggested by Klein and Spady (1993). The index estimator can be applied to mitigate
the issue of high dimensionality, while the functional form of the propensity score and the
distribution of the error terms are still unknown. In fact, Song (2014) shows that conditions
of the single index propensity score estimates have no effect on the asymptotic distribution of
treatment effects.
Most of the research on the treatment effect of inflation targeting has examined its impact
on the level of inflation and inflation volatility. One of the proposed benefits of having a
monetary policy regime with a nominal anchor is it enhances the credibility of central banks. As
a consequence, the volatility of important macroeconomic variables such as the exchange rate
and interest rate may be affected in addition to its impact on the sacrifice ratio. The adoption
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of IT may also nudge the fiscal policymakers to adopt fiscally responsible policies. Moreover,
inflation targeting can be able to bring inflation down at a lower cost. The second contribution
of our paper is to examine the effectiveness of the IT regime by not only investigating its
impact on inflation and inflation volatility, but also macroeconomic variables such as the level
of government debt, the sacrifice ratio, interest rate volatility, and exchange rate volatility.
The propensity score analysis for the IT regime involves estimating the probability of
conducting IT in the first stage. Other studies which have adopted the treatment effect approach
have ignored the role of financial market development in the probability of adopting inflation
targeting, in contrast to the literature that emphasizes the IT preconditions; researchers have
strongly opined that financial market development is one of the most important criteria for the
adoption and success of the IT regime (Amato and Gerlach (2002) and Bernanke and Woodford
(2005)). Our third contribution is that, in addition to the macroeconomic predictors used in
the previous studies, we use the central bank assets-GDP ratio and the private credit-GDP ratio
as proxies for financial market development in the first stage to estimate the probability of
adopting IT.
We find several interesting results from the semiparametric index models. First, we find that
there is no significant difference in the impact on inflation and inflation volatility in inflation
targeter versus non-inflation targeters in both the developed and developing economies. In
contrast, the parametric propensity scores suggest significant decline in inflation volatility in
developing countries. Secondly, the adoption of IT leads to significant decline in sacrifice
ratio and volatility of interest rate in developed inflation targeters, providing evidence on the
credibility hypothesis. However, we do not find a significant impact of IT on the sacrifice ratio
and interest rate volatility in developing economies. The adoption of IT leads to an increase
in volatility of exchange rates in developed economies, whereas it reduces the exchange rate
volatility in developing economies. Our results show that adoption of IT leads to improvement
in debt-GDP ratio in both the developed and the developing economies. Overall, our results
suggest that IT as a monetary policy strategy seems to have benefited developed economies more
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than developing economies mainly through the credibility enhancement channel. As a sensitivity
analysis, we use conventional covariates, contemporaneous covariates, and a smaller sample
period (before the 2008 financial crisis). The estimation results confirm that our approach is
robust to various scenarios and the approach to estimating propensity scores in the first stage
has significant impacts on the treatment effects.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following order. Section 2 reviews the IT
effectiveness from theoretical and practical points of view. Section 3 describes the data set
and country groups. Section 4 examines and compares the impact of IT using single index,
nonparametric, and parametric propensity scores and explains the problems associated with the
latter two models. Section 5 checks whether the results are robust to the inclusion of different
sets of covariates and the use of the pre-crisis sample period. Section 6 gives some concluding
remarks.
2 Background
2.1 Theoretical Context
Since the adoption of explicit inflation targeting by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in
1990, there has been an explosion of interest in the theoretical and empirical work on the effect
of inflation targeting. Most of the theoretical work has focused on examining whether inflation
targeting is an optimal monetary policy strategy. Central banks adopt explicit inflation targeting
by setting an instrument such that the inflation forecast and inflation target become identical.
Svensson (1996) interprets inflation targeting as a targeting rule that specifies a target variable
and target level to minimize a loss function. Central banks’ objective in period t is to choose a
sequence of intrest rates to minimize the loss function:
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Et
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−t L(piτ), (1)
where pi denotes inflation, Et is expectations conditional on information in year t, δ is the
discount factor, and L(piτ) is the loss function which can be written as the following:
Lt =
1
2
[(pit − pˆi)2 +λy2t ], (2)
where pˆi denotes the inflation target level, λ≥ 0 is the relative weight and yt is the output gap.
Thus, the inflation targeting framework is considered as the minimization of a loss function
over inflation and output gaps. The first-order condition can be written as pit+τ|t = pˆi, for τ≥ T ,
where pit+τ|t denotes a conditional forecast of pit+τ and T ≥ 0 is the shortest horizon at which
the instrument has an effect on inflation. In an explicit inflation targeting regime, the central
bank commits to minimizing a loss function, such that the target would be equal to the τ-step
ahead forecast. The effectiveness of this monetary policy framework can be considered through
the two channels of aggregate demand and expectations. In the aggregate demand channel,
monetary policy affects aggregate demand and then inflation via the Phillips curve. In the
expectations channel, monetary policy affects inflation by anchoring inflation expectations. The
latter view suggests the inflation forecast as a target provides better information about central
bank actions and therefore influences expectations. This transparency increases the effectiveness
of monetary policy (Svensson (1999)). As in Woodford (2005) and Svensson (2005a), a higher
degree of transparency improves the conduct of monetary policy. The consequences of the
transparency of central banks are a reduction in uncertainty about future policy actions and
anchoring actual inflation and inflation volatility.
In a theoretical framework, Demertzis and Hallett (2007) show the transparency of central
banks has no effect on the level of inflation and output, but decreases the volatility of inflation
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and the output gap. Morris and Shin (2002) address this issue through the lens of welfare
effects. They argue greater transparency does not necessarily improve social welfare. In an
economy with highly volatile inflation, the central bank is unlikely to have more information
than the private sector, and private information may crowd out the central bank’s disclosed
information, which leads to a greater volatility. However, Svensson (2005b) argues the results
of Morris and Shin (2002) are misinterpreted as an “anti-transparency.” He shows that the
higher degree of transparency increases the social welfare. Recently there has been a surge of
interest in the theoretical framework of inflation targeting effectiveness through the channels
of expectations, transparency, and the accountability of central banks.The consensus from the
theoretical literature suggests that focusing the impact of IT on level of inflation and inflation
volatility is not sufficient to measure the effectiveness of IT on macroeconomy. Therefore,
this study attempts to examine the impact of IT on not only the conventional macroeconomic
outcomes, but also the variables that may be affected due to expectations, credibility and
transparency channels.
2.2 Empirical Background
The existing empirical literature on the effectiveness of inflation targeting suffers from three
problems. The first issue is the estimation methodology. Second, the variables used to find the
likelihood of adopting inflation targeting ignore the conventional wisdom and extant literature
suggesting the role of preconditions in the effectiveness of inflation targeting. Third, most of the
work on inflation targeting using the treatment effect methodology has estimated the impact of
this regime on the level of inflation and inflation volatility. The literature lacks a comprehensive
study on a variety of outcome variables.
The empirical research on the effectiveness of inflation targeting has primarily attempted to
examine its impact on the level of inflation and inflation volatility. Initially most of the work
focused on examining the effectiveness of the IT regime by performing some form of an event
study analysis. This strand of literature compared the behavior of inflation and its volatility
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before and after the adoption of the IT regime. The event study approach was criticized on
the grounds that this methodology does not take into account the changes in the behavior of
inflation that would have taken place anyway in the absence of the IT regime. The criticism
was based on the global fall in inflation and inflation volatility that took place during the time
this regime was in place in different countries.
With reference to the estimation methodology, Ball and Sheridan (2003) find the effect
of IT by comparing improvements in targeters to improvements in non-targeters. They
apply the difference-in-differences approach. To reduce the bias from the correlation of the
outcome before the adoption of IT and the targeting dummy, they add the initial value of
the outcome to the differences regression. Ball and Sheridan (2003) argue by including the
initial value of the outcome to the differences regression, they control for regression to the
mean. They find no evidence inflation targeting improves countries’ economic performance.
After this study, researchers have attempted to find the causal effect of the IT adoption on
macroeconomic performance using the same methodology. Among them, Wu (2004) compares
the average change in inflation before and after the IT adoption. He includes the first lag of the
outcome variable to consider the persistence of the outcome. He finds that inflation targeters
experienced a decrease in average inflation rates after the adoption of IT. One main issue
with the differences-in-differences method is that the response in the differences-in-differences
estimation, which is the outcome variable such as inflation and inflation variability, is highly
serially correlated. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) address the question of whether there
is a causal effect of the adoption of inflation targeting on the macroeconomic outcomes. They
argue the adoption of IT is an endogenous choice, and the empirical findings may not imply
the causal effect of inflation targeting on economic performance. They control for endogeneity
using an instrument set, such as lagged values of inflation, nominal exchange rate depreciation,
and the federal funds rate. Their study suggests inflation targeting reduces inflation and output
volatilities and adopting IT improves the efficiency of monetary policy.
The problem which arises in estimating the average treatment effect of inflation is the
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selection problem. Inflation targeting selection is a process that permits central banks to adopt
inflation targeting in countries that meet some economic and institutional preconditions. To
address the selection problem of the IT adoption, Lin and Ye (2007) estimate average treatment
effects using propensity score matching methods. Propensity score analysis allows us to reduce
the dimensionality to a one-dimensional score and to balance the differences between targeters
and non-targeters. Using the outcome variables, such as inflation, inflation variability, and
interest rates, they show inflation targeting has no effect on economic performance. Recently,
other studies examine the effectiveness of IT by estimating treatment effects (Lin (2010),
Lucotte (2012), de Mendonca and de Guimaraes (2012), Lin and Ye (2013), and Minea and
Tapsoba (2014)). One important problem that has been neglected in the literature is the
misspecification of propensity scores. Zhao (2008) finds that the results of average treatment
effects are sensitive to the specifications of propensity scores. Hirano, Imbens and Ridder
(2003) propose a nonparametric series estimator in order to deal with misspecification. The
high-dimensionality in the nonparametric model creates other issues. To take into account
misspecification caused by the parametric model and the high-dimensionality problem created
by the nonparametric approach, we apply a semiparametric methodology in which there is no
distributional assumption on the error terms.
The second problem in the inflation targeting effectiveness literature is associated with
finding the likelihood of adopting inflation targeting. Most of studies have focused on finding
the effect of the macroeconomic variables on the likelihood of the IT adoption. However, a set
of preconditions impacts the probability of adopting inflation targeting, especially in emerging
market economies. The most important precondition discussed in the literature which has a
huge impact on inflation targeting is a healthy financial system (Amato and Gerlach (2002)
and Bernanke and Woodford (2005)). Effective monetary policy transmission is guaranteed
by a sound banking system and well-developed capital markets. To take into account this
criticism of the existing literature, we augment the first stage equation of estimating the
probability of adoption of inflation targeting by including the central bank-assets-GDP ratio and
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the credit-deposit ratio.
The third problem in finding the effectiveness of IT is most of the work on inflation targeting
using the treatment effect methodology has estimated the impact of the regime on the level
of inflation and inflation volatility. One of the proposed benefits of having a monetary policy
regime with a nominal anchor such as inflation targeting is it enhances the credibility of central
banks. The higher degree of credibility may influence the volatility of important macroeconomic
variables. Moreover, one of the requirements of a successful adoption of the IT regime is
the absence of fiscal dominance. Only a few papers (Lucotte (2012) and Minea and Tapsoba
(2014)) have looked at the role of the IT regime in disciplining the fiscal behavior of IT countries.
Additionally, inflation targeters may experience fewer output losses during disinflations. There
are two contrary views on the effect of inflation targeting on the sacrifice ratio (Goncalves and
Carvalho (2009) and Brito (2010)). However, the existing studies using the treatment effect
methodology have not examined the impact of IT on fiscal discipline and the sacrifice ratio.
3 Data Description
The data set for this study consists of 98 countries for the period from 1990 to 2013 on an
annual basis. Data are obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s World Development
Indicators and International Financial Statistics. Among our full sample, 27 countries are
inflation targeters (treated group) and 71 countries are non-targeters (control group). Table A1
in Appendix A presents the list of inflation targeting countries along with the adoption dates,
target levels at the adoption date, and their country groups. The lowest target rate at the date
of IT adoption belongs to Sweden and Thailand, two percent, and the highest rate is 15 percent
for Israel. Seven countries are described as industrial inflation targeters; other 20 targeters are
developing countries.2 Table A2 shows the list of countries used as the control group including
55 developing countries and 16 industrial economies. We impute incomplete multivariate data.
2IT industrial countries are: Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United
Kingdom.
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There are two approaches for the imputation of multivariate data: joint modeling (JM) and Fully
Conditional Specification (FCS), also known as Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equations
(MICE). We use the MICE method because the MICE algorithm preserves the relationships in
the data and retains the uncertainty about these relations (Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn
(2011)).
To examine the effectiveness of inflation targeting in emerging market and industrial
economies, we divide the sample into developing (DCS) and developed (IND) countries.
Table 1 indicates the sample sizes in the propensity score analysis for the full sample, industrial
economies and developing countries. The full sample contains all 98 countries. The sample size
is 2352, of which 1704 are control and 648 are treated units. After matching, 648 observations
are left for the outcome analysis. In the subsample of industrial economies, there are 26
countries, and the total number of observations is 624. The subsample of developing countries
includes 72 countries with 1728 observations.
Table 1: Sample sizes in the propensity score analysis for all samples
FULL IND DCS
Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated
All 1704 648 384 240 1320 408
Matched 648 648 240 240 408 408
Unmatched 1056 0 144 0 912 0
Discarded 0 0 0 0 0 0
FULL: full sample, IND: industrial economies, DCS: developing countries
The dependent variable used in the first stage estimation is the inflation targeting dummy,
which has the value one if the country adopts inflation targeting. We choose the following
covariates for the propensity score analysis and the estimation of average treatment effects:
openness, GDP growth, real money growth, inflation, a pegged exchanged regime dummy,
the central bank assets-GDP ratio, and the credit deposit-GDP ratio. Openness is measured as
exports plus imports divided by GDP, indicating the total trade as a percentage of GDP. In order to
specify pegged exchange regime in each country we follow Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).
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They provide a classification for exchange rate regimes. They decompose de facto exchange
regimes into “coarse” and “fine” components. The fine classification narrow the coarse measures
down into specific regimes. We focus here on the coarse classification by using code 1, 2, and 3
defined as exchange arrangements with no separate legal tender, currency board arrangements,
conventional fixed peg arrangements, crawling pegs, exchange rates within crawling bands,
and managed floating with no predetermined path for the exchange rate. This is also based on
IMF classification. We use a binary indicator which takes value of one if the country adopts
pegged exchange regime according to the above definition. Central bank assets-GDP ratio is
used as a measure of financial sophistication. Credit deposit to real sector by deposit money
bank is considered as the proxy of financial development.
In the second stage estimation, the outcome variables include inflation, fiscal discipline,
the sacrifice ratio, inflation variability, interest rate volatility, and real exchange rate volatility.
Following Lin and Ye (2007), we measure inflation variability by the standard deviation of
a three-year moving average of inflation. Real exchange volatility is defined as the standard
deviation of a three-year moving average of real exchange rates, and interest rate volatility
is defined as the standard deviation of a three-year moving average of 10-year government
bond interest rates. We consider the government debt-GDP ratio as an inverse proxy of fiscal
discipline. The sacrifice ratio is measured by the ratio of the change in output growth to the
change in inflation.
4 The Impact of Inflation Targeting
The parameter of interest in estimating the effects of inflation targeting on inflation and
inflation variability is the average treatment effects on the treated. In our study, inflation
targeting is considered as a treatment indicated by a binary random variable, Ti ∈ {0, 1}, where
Ti = 1 if inflation targeting is adopted and Ti = 0, otherwise. The outcome of interest is denoted
by Yi. We specify the inflation rate, the measure of fiscal discipline, the sacrifice ratio, inflation
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variability, a measure of inflation uncertainty, interest rate volatility, and exchange rate volatility.
We find whether Yi is affected by IT. For each country, there are two potential outcomes; Y0i is
the outcome when inflation targeting is not adopted, while Y1i is the potential outcome if this
strategy is adopted.
potential outcome =
 Y1i if Ti = 1Y0i if Ti = 0 . (3)
The causal effect of adopting inflation targeting in country i is the difference between Y1i and
Y0i. The difficulty in estimating the causal effect is that we do not observe both Y1i and Y0i, for
each country, since each country is either targeter or non-targeter. The observed outcome, Yi,
can be written in terms of potential outcomes as
Yi = TiY1i + (1− Ti)Y0i = Y0i + (Y1i − Y0i)Ti, (4)
where Y1i − Y0i is the causal effect of implementing inflation targeting. The average treatment
effect on the treated (ATT) is the expected effect of IT on economic outcomes for those countries
that actually have adopted an inflation targeting framework. This effect can be written as the
following:
τat t = E[Y1i − Y0i|Ti = 1]. (5)
4.1 Impact Evaluation through Propensity Score Analysis
When the treatment is randomized across countries, ATT can be consistently estimated. In
our case, however, the randomization of inflation targeting is infeasible. Inflation targeting
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selection is a process that permits central banks to adopt inflation targeting in countries that meet
some economic and institutional preconditions. Selection bias arises when targeters differ from
non-targeters for reasons other than the specific monetary policy framework; our observational
data lack the randomized assignment of countries into the adoption of IT. One way to overcome
the selection problem is to mimic the randomized experiment by utilizing the propensity score
analysis. Propensity score analysis is a quasi-experimental design used to estimate causal effect
in studies where units are not randomized to treatment. We assume two conditions to estimate
τat t : the unconfoundedness assumption which states the treatment is mean independent of the
outcomes conditional on the covariates, E(Y0|X , T ) = E (Y0|X ) and E(Y1|X , T ) = E (Y1|X ), and
the overlap assumption which states the likelihood that a country adopts inflation targeting is
less than one, pi(X )< 1, where pi(X )≡ Pr(T = 1|X ) is the conditional probability of adopting
inflation targeting conditional on a vector of observed covariates X (see Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) for more detailed discussion). As shown in Dehejia and Wahba (2002), given the
conditions, ATT is identified as
τat t = E (E(Yi|Ti = 1,pi(X i))−E(Yi|Ti = 0,pi(X i))|Ti = 1) . (6)
The benefits of using propensity score analysis are twofold: to reduce dimensionality to
a one-dimensional score and to balance the differences between targeters and non-targeters.
Targeters and non-targeters with the same value of the propensity score have the same
distribution of the observed covariate. Given the identification, propensity score analysis
includes two stages: the first stage estimates the propensity score,which is the conditional
probability of adopting IT. The second stage matches each IT country with a non-targeter based
on the propensity score and estimates ATT.
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4.2 A Semiparametric Propensity Score Matching Model
Since estimating the propensity score correctly is crucial, propensity score analysis could be
sensitive to the model specifications of the propensity score. We must take into consideration the
model specification of the first stage estimator for two reasons: the coefficients of the propensity
score are poorly estimated in the misspecified propensity score and using the parametric
propensity score sacrifices the efficiency of the estimator. The misspecified propensity score
has an influence on the estimated ATT (Zhao (2008)). The following example illustrates how
misspecified propensity scores given a vector of covariates x leads to biased results. Let y
be a continuous response, t be the treatment, τ be the treatment effect, and β is a vector of
parameters relating the covariates x to the response in the model E(y|x , t) = g(x;β) + δt.
Assume Ex |g(x;β)|<∞. Let y¯i denotes the sample averages of treated and control units and,
similarly, y¯i,pi(x) denotes the average response at the propensity score pi(x). In an observational
study τˆ= y¯1,pi(x) − y¯0,pi(x) is an unbiased estimator of treatment effect ( Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983)). Suppose that pi(x) is not known and misspecified to be some function φ(x). Then,
E[ y¯1 − y¯0|φ(x)] = τ+ Ex[g(x;β)|t = 1,φ(x)]− Ex[g(x;β)|t = 0,φ(x)] and y¯1,φ(x) − y¯0,φ(x)
is not unbiased for τ. We propose to use the semiparametric methods to deal with model
misspecification.
We apply a semiparametric single index model in the first stage estimation to examine the
effect of IT and compare the results with their nonparametric and parametric counterparts.
Among all the approaches for estimating propensity scores, the semiparametric single index
model provides the most accurate results. Applying a misspecified parametric propensity
score such as a probit model, pi(X i) = Pr(Ti|X i) = (2pi)−1/2ex p[−(X iβi)2/2], leads us to
an inconsistent estimate of average treatment effects. Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003)
suggest a nonparametric propensity score to deal with the misspecification problem. They
estimate propensity scores in a sieve approach by the series logit estimator; nonetheless, the
nonparametric estimator suffers from the “curse of dimensionality.” The curse of dimensionality
refers to a poor performance of the nonparametric series method for multivariate data. The
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behavior of nonparametric estimators deteriorates as the dimension of the observed covariates
increases because of the sparseness of multidimensional data (Stone (1980)).3 To break
the curse of dimensionality, we apply the semiparametric single index model for estimating
propensity scores. The semiparametric single index model is an alternative approach to mitigate
bias arising from the curse of dimensionality. It also avoids the problem of error distribution
misspecification. The single index model for the binary response is suggested by Klein and
Spady (1993). The index model is given by:
T = g(X ′β0) + u, (7)
where T is the binary dependent variable, X ∈ Rd is the vector of explanatory variables, and the
functional form of g(·) is unknown. Klein and Spady (1993) suggest estimating the parameters
by the maximum likelihood method:
L (β , h) =∑
i
(1− Ti) ln(1− gˆ−i(X ′iβ)) +
∑
i
Ti ln( gˆ−i(X ′iβ)), (8)
where L (·) is the log-likelihood function and gˆ−i(X ′iβ) is the leave-one-out estimator. We
apply the estimated index propensity scores to estimate the ATT. There are some identifiability
conditions for estimating semiparametric single index models. X i must contain at least one
continuous random variable and cannot contain a constant. X i does not include a constant term,
because β0 cannot contain the location parameter which is known as the location normalization
condition (See Hayfield and Racine (2008) for more details on how to apply this normalization).
The first component of X i also has a unit coefficient which is known as the scale normalization
condition. We set the lagged openness coefficient to one. We report the results of estimating the
3In other words, the speed of convergence decreases, when the observations are sparsely distributed. The
optimal bandwidth converges at O (N −24+d ), where d is the dimension. The curse of dimensionality refers to the
problem where the convergence rate is inversely related to the number of covariates (Li and Racine (2011)).
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average treatment effect on the treated using nearest neighbor matching.4 Nearest neighbor
matching selects the r best non-targeter matches for each inflation targeting country. Finally,
we use the matched sample for the outcome analysis.
Certain preconditions are necessary for IT to be successful. These preconditions fall into
four categories: institutional independence, well-developed technical infrastructure, economic
structure, and a healthy financial system. Among them, a healthy financial system is one of
the important pre-requisites for inflation targeting as a monetary policy strategy. We need a
sound banking system and well-developed capital markets to guarantee an effective monetary
policy transmission. We use central bank assets-GDP and private credit-GDP ratios as proxies
for financial system development. Our results of the single index model for central bank assets
are different among country groups; the higher central bank assets-GDP ratio increases the
likelihood of adopting IT in industrial countries and lowers it in developing countries. This
implies that the expansion of central banks’ balance sheets as a share of GDP causes a loss in
their credibility and decreases the probability of adopting IT. We also use the private credit-GDP
ratio to measure financial depth. Financial depth indicates the financial resources, such as loans
and non-equity securities, available to the private sector. Figure 1 shows the scatter plot and
kernel densities of the estimated semiparametric propensity scores. The scatter plot shows the
spread of propensity scores. As shown in the plot, propensity scores are scattered between
zero and one. The kernel densities of propensity scores for the control and treated units are
shown in the solid lines and dashed lines, respectively. We find that the densities of propensity
scores for countries that did and did not adopt inflation targeting in the full sample, industrial
economies, and developing countries are different, indicating that matching would improve the
results of the estimation.
Table 2 presents the results of semiparametric single index models for the full, industrial,
and developing samples. Our findings suggest that GDP growth as an indicator of the level of
economic development is inversely correlated with the probability of the IT adoption in the
4Although we perform the matching procedure by full, optimal, and genetic matching. We find the similar
results to those presented in this paper.
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full sample, developing countries, and developed economies. Our results are consistent with
Lucotte (2012) and Samarina, Terpstra and De Haan (2013), who argue that countries with
poor performance are more likely to adopt inflation targeting. Furthermore, real money growth
is negatively associated with the probability of adopting IT in all country groups.
Table 2: Single index models for all samples
FULL IND DCS
Lagged GDP Growth -0.18∗∗∗ -2.63∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.967) (0.026)
Lagged Money Growth -0.15∗∗∗ -0.97∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗
(0.004) (0.083) (0.003)
Lagged Inflation -0.06∗∗∗ -0.67∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.108) (0.014)
Pegged Exchange Regime -0.30∗∗∗ -0.19 -2.21∗∗∗
(0.170) (1.153) (0.563)
Lagged CB Assets 0.17∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.119) (0.030)
Lagged Credit Deposit -0.23∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.018) (0.019)
The dependent variable is the targeting dummy, which has the
value 1 if the country adopts inflation targeting.
The lagged openness coefficient is normalized to one.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
We apply the results of the semiparametric single index model to estimate the average
treatment effect on the treated. Song (2014) finds that, in propensity score analysis, the
conditions of single index propensity score estimates do not affect the asymptotic distribution
of treatment effects even when the single index propensity score is cube-root consistent.
Table 3 presents the ATTs using the single index estimate of propensity score. Our findings
are summarized as follows:
1. The results from the index model show that there is no significant impact on the level of
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Figure 1: Scatter plot and kernel densities of the estimated semiparametric propensity scores
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Table 3: Average treatment effect on the treated, single index
propensity scores
pi debt SR σpi σi σs
FULL -0.31 -14.35∗∗∗ -0.17 -1.05∗ -0.94∗∗ -1.58∗
(0.92) (2.02) (0.15) (0.64) (0.33) (0.61)
IND 0.05 -36.62∗∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.48∗∗ 2.17∗∗
(0.21) (3.05) (0.28) (0.10) (0.24) (0.51)
DCS 1.65 -8.51∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.22 0.14 -1.07∗
(1.31) (2.66) (0.18) (0.86) (0.42) (0.85)
Outcomes are inflation (pi), the debt-GDP ratio (debt) as a proxy for fiscal
discipline, the sacrifice ratio (SR) measured by the change in output to the
change in inflation, inflation variability (σpi), interest rate volatility (σi),
and exchange rate volatility (σs). Volatilities are measured by the standard
deviation of a three-year moving average.
FULL: the full sample, IND: industrial economies, DCS: developing
countries.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
inflation in IT economies as compared to a non-targeter. For inflation volatility, we find a
decline for the full-sample at the 10 percent significance level, though this disappears
when we break the sample into developing and developed economies. This result is
consistent with Lin and Ye (2007) who also find no significant effect on either inflation
or inflation variability. Overall the decline in inflation and inflation volatility observed
during this time period in inflation targeters may have also been experienced by non
inflation targeters.
2. The ATTs on the government debt-GDP ratio for the full sample, developed economies,
and developing countries are -14.35, -36.62, and -8.51, respectively. The statistically
significant negative estimates have two implications: inflation targeting improves fiscal
discipline and the impact of IT on fiscal discipline in industrial countries is significantly
larger than that of in developing economies. IT adoption encourages fiscal authorities
to improve fiscal discipline to support central banks to build up their credibility. Most of
developing countries that have adopted inflation targeting did not meet the preconditions
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of the IT adoption. Accordingly, they enhance fiscal discipline in order to convince the
private sector of their commitment to price stability. Adopting IT helps the governments
in industrial economies to reduce the level of their debt. They implement fiscal policies at
the same time to anchor the price level. One of the consequences is lowering debt and
improving fiscal discipline. Minea and Tapsoba (2014) indicate that inflation targeting
improves fiscal discipline only in developing countries.
3. The comparison of the effect of IT on the sacrifice ratio among all subsamples implies
that industrial targeters were able to reduce inflation at a lower cost than developing
targeters. The ATT for industrial economies is -0.93, which is statistically significant at
the one percent significance level.
4. The ATTs on interest rate volatility are negative and statistically significant for the full
sample and industrial economies. Less volatile interest rate is a sign of more credible
central banks. Chadha and Nolan (2001) provide a theoretical model to link transparency
and interest rate volatility. They argue that information flows lead to a reduction in the
volatility of interest rates.
5. There is no consensus in the literature about how the adoption of the IT regime would
affect the volatility of exchange rates. Inflation targeting may move the focus of central
banks, especially in emerging markets, away from foreign exchange markets. Mishkin and
Savastano (2001), for example, suggest a floating exchange rate system is a requirement
for a well-functioning inflation targeting regime which is the idea behind the “Impossibility
of the Holy Trinity.” The Impossibility of the Holy Trinity suggests independent monetary
policy cannot coexist with a pegged exchange rate regime. The connection between
inflation targeting and floating exchange rates has led some analysts to argue that one
of the costs of IT is the increase in exchange rate volatility. However, Gregorio, Tokman
and Valdés (2005) discuss this issue in the Chilean context and show in Chile nominal
exchange rate volatility has not been higher than in other countries with floating exchange
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rates. Similarly, Edwards (2006) argues that a credible monetary policy can reduce the
exchange rate volatility. We examine the relationship between inflation targeting and
exchange rate volatility using our propensity score matching analysis. We find IT reduces
exchange rate volatility in developing countries (ATT= -1.07), but increases it in industrial
economies (ATT = 2.17). Lin (2010) also shows that inflation targeting has different
impacts on exchange rate volatility in different country groups. He argues that the IT
regime significantly lowers the volatility of exchange rates in industrial economies and
increases them in developing countries. Rose (2007) also finds that inflation targeters
experienced lower real exchange rate volatility than non-targeters.5
Overall, our results from the semiparametric index model suggests that developed economies
seem to benefit more from the IT regime as these countries witness a relative decline in the
sacrifice ratio and interest rate volatility. The decline in the sacrifice ratio and interest rate
volatility suggests that developed countries adopting the IT regime build higher credibility
and as a result inflation could be reduced at a lower output loss and also lower interest rate
volatility. With regard to an increase in volatility of exchange rates for developed economies
and reduction for the developing economies, it can be argued that stabilizing exchange rates
is not one of the foremost objectives of the central banks in developed economies. However,
the central banks in developing economies do take into account exchange rate volatility and
in some scenarios their ability to control the inflation rate may also be dependent on a stable
exchange rate regime.
4.3 Nonparametric Series Propensity Scores
Another way of dealing with the model misspecification problem is to use a nonparametric
method. We apply the nonparametric series estimator proposed by Hirano, Imbens and Ridder
(2003) to estimate consistent propensity scores in a matching framework. The nonparametric
5The above propensity score estimates are based on the normalization of the lagged openness coefficient. As a
robustness check, we estimate the treatment effects using different normalized coefficients in the first stage and
find consistent results.
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series estimator can be used when the functional form of the propensity score and the distribution
of the error terms are unknown. Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003) estimate pi(x) in a sieve
approach by the series logit estimator (SLE). Suppose RK(x) = (r1K(x), r2K(x), . . . , rkK(x))′ be a
K-vector of functions where K = 1,2, . . .. The SLE is defined by pˆi(x) = Λ(Rk(x)′pˆiK), where
Λ(a) = exp(a)/(1+exp(a)) is the logistic distribution function. pˆik is estimated as the following:
pˆiK = argmax
pi
N∑
i=1
(Ti · ln(Λ(Rk(x)′pi)) + (1− Ti) · ln(1−Λ(Rk(x)′pi)). (9)
Table B1 summarizes the nonparametric series estimates where power series functions are
adopted to approximate the unknown function. The nonparametric model consists of 35
covariates including the second powers and their interaction terms. The estimation is stopped at
the second power, because standard errors become very large, causing instability in the estimates
of the coefficients as the order of power series increases due to the curse of dimensionality.
Table 4 shows the ATTs using the nonparametric series propensity scores. The average treatment
effect on the treated for debt, the inverse measure of fiscal discipline, is statistically significant
and negative across all samples. The magnitude is larger for industrial countries than for
developing economies. We find the similar results for the fiscal discipline outcome using single
index and nonparametric propensity scores. We find real exchange rate volatility increased in
developed countries and decreased in developing countries. The findings for other outcomes of
interest are mostly different between the two methods. In the full sample, IT reduces the sacrifice
ratio and the impact is statistically significant at the one percent level. As mentioned before,
however, we need to be cautious in interpreting the estimation results, since the nonparametric
approach is unstable given that the number of covariates is large.
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Table 4: Average treatment effect on the treated, nonparametric
propensity scores
pi debt SR σpi σi σs
FULL 1.91∗∗ -27.37∗∗∗ -1.62∗∗∗ -1.47∗∗ -0.28 0.01
(0.81) (2.2) (0.18) (0.69) (0.33) (0.56)
IND -0.19 -23.65∗∗∗ -0.36 -0.07 0.31∗∗ 2.61∗∗∗
(0.13) (2.72) (0.28) (0.13) (0.13) (0.39)
DCS 2.54∗∗ -15.36∗∗∗ 0.12 1.23∗ -0.83∗ -0.17
(1.14) (2.8) (0.18) (0.72) (0.46) (0.74)
Outcomes are inflation (pi), the debt-GDP ratio (debt) as a proxy for fiscal
discipline, the sacrifice ratio (SR) measured by the change in output to the
change in inflation, inflation variability (σpi), interest rate volatility (σi),
and exchange rate volatility (σs). Volatilities are measured by the standard
deviation of a three-year moving average.
FULL: the full sample, IND: industrial economies, DCS: developing
countries.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
4.4 Parametric Propensity Scores
In addition to applying semiparametric single index and nonparametric models, we use
the conventional parametric propensity scores to estimate treatment effects and compare
the findings with its counterparts. The existing literature on the treatment effect of IT
has mainly used parametric methods. The conditional probability of adopting inflation
targeting, pi(X i) = Pr(Ti = 1|X i), can be estimated by a probit model, pi(X i) = E(Ti|X i) =
(2pi)−1/2ex p[−(X iβi)2/2], or a logit model, pi(X i) = (1 + e−X iβi)−1. The results of the probit
model are presented in Table B2. We also estimate the propensity score using a logit model.
The estimates are similar to the probit, so we omit them for brevity. The response variable
is the targeting dummy and takes the value of 1 if the country adopts inflation targeting. In
the first stage estimation of treatment effects, we include both institutional characteristics and
macroeconomic predictors to estimate the likelihood of adopting IT. We find different results for
the single index and parametric models. For example, the signs of lagged credit deposit-GDP
coefficients are opposite among all samples. It holds true for the lagged central bank assets-GDP
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and lagged money growth coefficients. We also capture these differences by comparing Figure 1
and Figure 2. Figure 2 plots kernel densities of the estimated probit propensity scores. The
densities of index estimates differ from those of parametric estimates for both treated and
control units.
After propensity scores are estimated, we match targeters to non-targeters based on the
estimated propensity scores. Figure 2 illustrates that the distributions between control and
treated groups are quite different among all samples. Thus, we expect that matching improves
the results of treatment effects. Figure 3 plots the histograms of the estimated probit propensity
scores before (left graphs) and after (right graphs) matching for the full sample. The distribution
of the propensity scores for non-targeters changes after applying the nearest-neighbor matching
and it is close to the distribution of the propensity scores for targeters. We examine the balance
of each covariate graphically in Figure 4 for all samples. The covariates are lcba, the lagged
central bank assets-GDP ratio, l pcd, the lagged credit deposit-GDP ratio, l gdpg, lagged GDP
growth, l rmg, lagged money growth, l pi, lagged inflation, and lopen, lagged openness. If the
empirical distributions are the same for targeters and non-targeters, the points in the Q-Q plots
lie on the 45 degree line. Deviations from it imply differences in the empirical distribution. As
shown in these plots, matching would improve the empirical distribution for lagged openness
and lagged GDP growth in the full sample.
The results of average treatment effect on the treated using parametric propensity scores
are presented in Table 5. In all samples, the ATTs on inflation is negative, but not statistically
significant. The ATT estimates using the parametric model are different than those estimated by
the semiparametric model. The contrary signifies the impact of propensity score misspecification
on the ATTs. Other results supporting our view are the estimates on the sacrifice ratio, inflation
variability, and interest rate volatility. The average treatment effect on the treated on inflation
variability is negative across different country groups and coefficients are statistically significant
in the full sample and developing subsamples.
The sign of treatment effects on fiscal discipline and exchange rate volatility are similar
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Figure 2: Scatter plot and kernel densities of the estimated probit propensity scores
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(e) Developing Countries (f) Developing Countries
Figure 4: QQ plots for all covariates
The covariates are lcba, the lagged central bank assets-GDP ratio, l pcd, the lagged credit deposit-GDP ratio,
l gdpg, lagged GDP growth, l rmg, lagged money growth, l pi, lagged inflation, and lopen, lagged openness.
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Table 5: Average treatment effect on the treated, probit propensity
scores
pi debt SR σpi σi σs
FULL -0.70 -21.29∗∗∗ -0.06 -1.88∗∗∗ -1.22∗∗∗ -1.53∗∗∗
(0.97) (2.23) (0.15) (0.67) (0.34) (0.6)
IND -0.05 -33.9∗∗∗ -0.2 -0.16 -0.06 1.77∗∗∗
(0.23) (3.49) (0.3) (0.14) (0.19) (0.48)
DCS -0.72 -11.68∗∗∗ -0.02 -1.93∗∗ -0.68 -2.01∗∗
(1.51) (2.78) (0.18) (0.98) (0.47) (0.81)
Outcomes are inflation (pi), the debt-GDP ratio (debt) as a proxy for fiscal
discipline, the sacrifice ratio (SR) measured by the change in output to the
change in inflation, inflation variability (σpi), interest rate volatility (σi),
and exchange rate volatility (σs). Volatilities are measured by the standard
deviation of a three-year moving average.
FULL: the full sample, IND: industrial economies, DCS: developing countries.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
compared to the index results, but the magnitudes are different. The effects of IT on inflation,
inflation variability, the sacrifice ratio, and interest rate volatility are inconsistent. The results
suggest that the choice of propensity scores has a considerable impact on the treatment effect
estimates. The semiparametric single index framework provides more accurate effect estimates.
Our empirical study suggests that the single index coefficient regression model in conjunction
with the proposed estimation method could be useful in propensity score analysis.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
A vast literature uses parametric propensity score matching to examine the effectiveness of
inflation targeting. The sensitivity analysis determines whether the results from our proposed
semiparametric approach are robust to various scenarios. As a robustness check, we report the
results of the first and second stages when the conventional covariates are used. Conventional
covariates are macroeconomic predictors in which the preconditions are not included. We also
compare the ATTs when the contemporaneous variables are used in the first stage. Our last
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comparison involves propensity score models for the pre-crisis period.
5.1 Conventional Covariates
One of the contributions of this paper is to include preconditions in the estimation of
propensity scores. Existing studies such as Lin and Ye (2007) estimate propensity scores based
only upon macroeconomic predictors. In the previous sections, we show how preconditions
affect the likelihood of the IT adoption. We compare our results to the literature by estimating
propensity scores with conventional covariates. Tables 6 and 7 include treatment effects of IT
using the single index and probit propensity scores. The comparison of Table 6 with Table 3
implies the ATTs on inflation using the conventional covariates in the first stage differs from the
results using all the variables. This holds true for the sacrifice ratio in the full and developing
samples, inflation variability for the full sample, and interest rate volatility in the developing
sample. The findings in this section signify the role of preconditions.
Table 6: Average treatment on the treated, index propensity scores
with conventional covariates
pi debt SR σpi σi σs
FULL 0.27 -13.92∗∗∗ 0.04 -0.34 -1.05∗∗∗ -2.36∗∗∗
(0.85) (2.13) (0.15) (0.54) (0.32) (0.64)
IND -0.23 -29.41∗∗∗ -1.44∗∗∗ -0.14 -0.74∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗
(0.19) (2.85) (0.29) (0.13) (0.29) (0.55)
DCS -0.11 -9.98∗∗∗ -0.04 -0.72 -0.61 -1.67∗
(1.56) (2.65) (0.17) (0.92) (0.46) (0.86)
Outcomes are inflation (pi), the debt-GDP ratio (debt) as a proxy for fiscal
discipline, the sacrifice ratio (SR) measured by the change in output to the
change in inflation, inflation variability (σpi), interest rate volatility (σi),
and exchange rate volatility (σs). Volatilities are measured by the standard
deviation of a three-year moving average.
FULL: the full sample, IND: industrial economies, DCS: developing countries.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 7: Average treatment on the treated, probit propensity scores
with conventional covariates
pi debt SR σpi σi σs
FULL -0.88 -15.92∗∗∗ -0.08 -1.33∗∗ -1.81∗∗∗ -2.47∗∗∗
(0.88) (2.03) (0.16) (0.59) (0.34) (0.61)
IND -0.02 -34.85∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02 -0.32 1.75∗∗∗
(0.16) (3.45 ) (0.29) (0.11) (0.24) (0.51)
DCS -1.11 -13.96∗∗∗ -0.04 -1.45∗ -1.18∗∗ -2.32∗∗∗
(1.53) (2.58) (0.18) (0.87) (0.47) (0.82)
Outcomes are inflation (pi), the debt-GDP ratio (debt) as a proxy for fiscal
discipline, the sacrifice ratio (SR) measured by the change in output to the
change in inflation, inflation variability (σpi), interest rate volatility (σi),
and exchange rate volatility (σs). Volatilities are measured by the standard
deviation of a three-year moving average.
FULL: the full sample, IND: industrial economies, DCS: developing countries.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
5.2 Lagged vs. Contemporaneous Covariates
The literature on treatment effects of IT lacks a rigorous explanation of endogeneity. Gertler
(2005) points to the endogeneity problem in examining whether IT is effective. He explains the
difficulties of identifying its effects have been raised by Ball and Sheridan (2003) and Mishkin
and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007). We note there is a lag period in response to the inflation targeting
framework. In order to consider the lag in the effect IT, we model the likelihood of IT using
lagged covariates. However, some studies estimate the propensity score using contemporaneous
variables. This section shows the robustness of our findings compared to those which include
covariates at level.
Table B4 summarizes the first stage estimations using the single index model with
contemporaneous variables. Tables 8 and 9 present the average treatment effect on the
treated using corresponding variables and methods. The treatment effects on all variables
considering contemporaneous variables are similar to the treatment effects from the baseline
model suggesting the robustness of our results to the use of conventional covariates. The point
estimates, however, are different. For example, as compared to the baseline model we find
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that IT leads to reduction in inflation, inflation volatility and interest rate volatility, though
these effects are insignificant for the developing economies. Comparing Table 9 with Table 5
shows that the treatment effects are not sensitive to the choice of variables in case of parametric
specification except interest rate volatility where the effect is significantly negative in the case
of conventional covariates. Consistent with the comparison of the semiparametric model with
the parametric model in the case of the baseline model, we also find differences in the results
when we use conventional variables. For example, using parametric propensity score, we find
that the treatment effect on inflation volatility is significantly negative.
Table 8: Average treatment on the treated, index propensity scores
with the contemporaneous covariates
pi debt SR σpi σi σs
FULL 0.77 -15.34∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.6 -0.82∗∗∗ -2.06∗∗∗
(0.81) (2.11) (0.15) (0.55) (0.32) (0.61)
IND -0.13 -39.69∗∗∗ -0.78∗∗∗ -0.1 -0.31 0.96∗∗
(0.21) (3.25) (0.31) (0.13) (0.23) (0.48)
DCS 1.43 0.26 0.07 0.35 -0.18 -1.73∗∗
(1.29) (2.53) (0.17) (0.79) (0.45) (0.83)
Outcomes are inflation (pi), the debt-GDP ratio (debt) as a proxy for fiscal
discipline, the sacrifice ratio (SR) measured by the change in output to the
change in inflation, inflation variability (σpi), interest rate volatility (σi),
and exchange rate volatility (σs). Volatilities are measured by the standard
deviation of a three-year moving average.
FULL: the full sample, IND: industrial economies, DCS: developing countries.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
5.3 Pre-crisis Period
The empirical work on the IT effectiveness has considered a sample period before the global
financial crisis (Ball and Sheridan (2003), Lin and Ye (2007), Lucotte (2012), and Lin and Ye
(2013)). Our sample period of 1990–2013 includes years after the crisis. In this section we
consider whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of the crisis and the post-crisis time
periods by estimating the model for the pre-crisis period (1990–2007). Table B5 summarizes
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Table 9: Average treatment on the treated, probit propensity
scores with contemporaneous variables
pi debt SR σpi σi σs
FULL 0.39 -17.68∗∗∗ -0.09 -1.13∗∗ -1.2∗∗∗ -1.37∗∗
(0.88) (2.14) (0.16) (0.56) (0.33) (0.58)
IND -0.04 -32.71∗∗∗ -0.37 -0.16 0.01 2.07∗∗
(0.22) (3.27) (0.33) (0.15) (0.18) (0.47)
DCS -0.2 -12.42∗∗∗ 0.07 -1.71 -0.55 -1.85∗∗
(1.51) (2.72) (0.18) (1.00) (0.48) (0.81)
Outcomes are inflation (pi), the debt-GDP ratio (debt) as a proxy for fiscal
discipline, the sacrifice ratio (SR) measured by the change in output to
the change in inflation, inflation variability (σpi), interest rate volatility
(σi), and exchange rate volatility (σs). Volatilities are measured by the
standard deviation of a three-year moving average.
FULL: the full sample, IND: industrial economies, DCS: developing
countries.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
the results of the first stage using conventional variables for the pre-crisis period. We exclude
the lagged central bank assets ratio and the lagged credit deposit-GDP ratio. The findings of the
second stage estimation, Table 10, indicate the effect of IT on fiscal discipline remains unchanged
prior to the crisis which is consistent with our previous findings. We interpret these robust
results as evidence for the causal role of inflation targeting per se on fiscal discipline. Inflation
variability has decreased in all targeters in the pre-crisis period. However, the coefficient is not
statistically significant. The treatment effects on interest rate volatility remain the same before
the crisis. The findings presented in Table 10 and the comparison with the full sample period
(Table 3) determine our main findings are not sensitive to the post-crisis period.
Lin and Ye (2007) also referred to the selection problem, but their approach is estimating the
propensity scores parametrically. They use a sample of 22 industrial countries over the period
1985–1999. Our Table 11 presents the results most comparable to those of Lin and Ye (2007).6
Their ATTs on inflation for the constant and non-constant inflation targeting frameworks are
-.002 and -0.0034. The ATTs are not statistically significant. We find the ATT on inflation
6See Tables 3 and 4 in P. 2528 of Lin and Ye (2007).
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for industrial countries -0.88 which is statistically significant at the one percent level. Their
treatment effects on inflation variability are -.0003 and .0009 and are not statistically significant.
Our treatment effect on inflation variability is -2.93 and statistically significant at the one percent
level. One reason for the huge difference is the choice of misspecified parametric propensity
scores versus the semiparametric counterpart.
Table 10: Average treatment on the treated, single index propensity
scores with conventional covariates (pre-crisis periods)
pi debt SR σpi σi σs
FULL -0.10 -14.94∗∗∗ 0.08 -0.94 -0.63∗ -2.37∗∗∗
(1.26) (2.4) (0.16) (0.80) (0.37) (0.76)
IND -0.49∗∗ -33.72∗∗∗ -1.26∗∗∗ -0.11 -1.26∗∗∗ -0.27
(0.21) (3.65) (0.32) (0.14) (0.36) (0.84)
DCS 0.94 -5.60∗ 0.10 -0.91 0.20 -0.95
(1.86) (3.25) (0.18) (1.23) (0.50) (1.02)
FULL: the full sample, IND: industrial economies, DCS: developing countries.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table 11 summarizes the average treatment on the treated, index propensity scores with
contemporaneous covariates for the pre-crisis periods. Fiscal discipline is robust to the
contemporaneous variables.
Table 11: Average treatment on the treated, single index propensity
scores with contemporaneous covariates (pre-crisis periods)
pi debt SR σpi σi σs
FULL 1.72 -15.6∗∗∗ 0.06 0.32 -0.37 -0.88
(1.08) (2.46) (0.15) (0.66) (0.37) (0.72)
IND -0.88∗∗∗ -21.72∗∗∗ -1.15∗∗∗ -2.93∗∗∗ -0.51∗ 2.71∗∗∗
(0.25) (3.00) (0.28) (0.47) (0.29) (0.57)
DCS 3.41∗∗ -4.11 -0.21 0.07 0.37 -1.32
(1.65) (3.38) (0.18) (1.10) (0.51) (0.89)
FULL: the full sample, IND: industrial economies, DCS: developing countries.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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6 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper is to examine the causal effect of the IT adoption on macroeconomic
performance using a semiparametric index model. The semiparametric index model takes into
account the inconsistent estimation of propensity scores and the ‘curse of dimensionality"
problem associated with the nonparametric model. We also consider the prominent role of
preconditions in IT adoption by including the central bank assets-GDP ratio and the private
credit-GDP ratio in the first stage estimations of the probability of adoption of IT. In addition to
examining the impact on level of inflation and inflation volatility, we also estimate the treatment
effect on volatility of interest rate and exchange rate, sacrifice ratio and the debt-GDP ratio.
This provides us a measure of the indirect effect of IT.
We find that the treatment effect on inflation and inflation volatility is insignificant for
both the developed and the developing economies. This result is in contrast to the parametric
propensity scores that suggest significant decline in inflation volatility in developing countries.
The results from the semiparametric model also suggest a decline in sacrifice ratio and interest
rate volatility for the developed country inflation targeters, whereas the impact is insignificant in
case of developing economies. The adoption of IT leads to an increase in volatility of exchange
rate in developed economies, whereas it reduces the exchange rate volatility in developing
economies. Our results show that adoption of IT leads to improvement in debt-GDP ratio in
both the developed and the developing economies. Overall, our findings present mixed results
and have differential impact on various variables in developed and developing economies.
As a sensitivity analysis, we use a smaller sample period (pre-crisis) with conventional and
contemporaneous covariates to compare our results with Lin and Ye (2007) who use the
parametric propensity scores. We find the approach to estimate propensity scores in the first
stage has significant impacts on the treatment effects.
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Appendix A
Table A1 provides the list of inflation targeting countries along with the adoption dates,
target level at the adoption date and their country groups, whether the country is developed or
developing. Table A2 presents the control units and their country groups. The first country that
has adopted explicit inflation targeting is New Zealand with the target rate of 4 percent at the
adoption date and the last one is Serbia with the target rate of 8 percent in 2006Q3.
Table A1: Treated group (targeters): adoption date,
target level at the adoption date, and country group
Countries Adoption Date Target Group
Armenia 2006Q1 4 DCS
Australia 1993Q2 3 IND
Brazil 1999Q2 8 DCS
Canada 1991Q1 4 IND
Chile 1999Q3 3 DCS
Colombia 1999Q3 5 DCS
Czech 1997Q4 6 DCS
Ghana 2002Q1 12 DCS
Guatemala 2005Q1 5 DCS
Hungary 2001Q2 7 DCS
Iceland 2001Q1 4 IND
Indonesia 2005Q3 5 DCS
Israel 1992Q1 15 DCS
Mexico 2001Q1 5 DCS
New Zealand 1989Q4 4 IND
Norway 2001Q1 3 IND
Peru 2002Q1 3 DCS
Philippines 2002Q1 5 DCS
Poland 1998Q1 8 DCS
Romania 2005Q3 8 DCS
Serbia 2006Q3 8 DCS
South Africa 2000Q1 3 DCS
South Korea 1998Q2 9 DCS
Sweden 1993Q1 2 IND
Thailand 2000Q2 2 DCS
Turkey 2006Q1 5 DCS
UK 1992Q3 3 IND
DCS denotes developing countries and IND indicates
industrial economies.
39
Table A2: Control group (non-targeters)
Countries Group Countries Group
Albania DCS Madagascar DCS
Algeria DCS Malawi DCS
Argentina DCS Malaysia DCS
Armenia DCS Maldives DCS
Austria IND Mali DCS
Azerbaijan DCS Malta IND
Belarus DCS Moldova DCS
Belgium DCS Morocco DCS
Belize DCS Mozambique DCS
Bolivia DCS Myanmar DCS
Bulgaria DCS Nepal DCS
China DCS Netherlands IND
Costa Rica DCS Nicaragua DCS
Cyprus IND Niger DCS
Denmark IND Saudi Arabia DCS
Ecuador DCS Senegal DCS
Egypt DCS Singapore IND
El Salvador DCS Slovenia IND
Estonia DCS Spain IND
Fiji DCS Sri Lanka DCS
France IND Sudan DCS
Germany IND Swaziland DCS
Greece IND Tanzania DCS
India DCS Tunisia DCS
Iran DCS Uganda DCS
Ireland IND Ukraine DCS
Italy IND United Arab Emirates DCS
Jamaica DCS United States IND
Japan IND Uruguay DCS
Jordan DCS Vanuatu DCS
Kazakhstan DCS Venezuela DCS
Kenya DCS Vietnam DCS
Lebanon DCS Yemen DCS
Libya DCS Zambia DCS
Luxembourg IND Zimbabwe DCS
Macedonia DCS
DCS denotes developing countries and IND indicates industrial
economies.
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Appendix B
Appendix B summarizes the first stage estimates.
Nonparametric Propensity Scores
Table B1 includes the results of the nonparametric series estimates proposed by Hirano,
Imbens and Ridder (2003). The variables in Table B1 are defined as follows: X1 is lagged
openness. X2 is lagged GDP growth. X3 indicates lagged real money growth. X4 is lagged
inflation. X5 denotes the pegged exchange regime dummy. X6 and X7 represent lagged CB
assets-GDP and lagged private credit-GDP, respectively. Our model consists of 35 covariates
including the second powers and their interaction terms. The estimation is stopped at the
second power, because standard errors become very large, causing instability in the estimates
of the coefficients.
Parametric Propensity Scores
The results of the probit model are presented in Table B2. We also estimate the propensity
score using a logit model. The estimates are similar to probit. The response variable is the
targeting dummy and takes the value of 1 if the country adopts inflation targeting. In the
first stage estimation of treatment effects, we include both institutional characteristics and
macroeconomic predictors to estimate the likelihood of adopting IT. We find a statistically
significant and negative relation between openness and the likelihood of adopting IT for the full
sample, industrial economies and developing countries. A higher degree of openness lowers
the probability of adopting IT. As pointed out by Romer (1993), more open economies are
less likely to adopt inflation targeting. Under monetary expansion, the real exchange rate
depreciates. Since the harms of real depreciation are greater in more open economies, the
degree of openness and the benefits of expansion are inversely related. Moreover, GDP growth
lowers the probability of the IT adoption.
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Table B1: Nonparametric series models for the full, industrial, and developing
samples
Covariates FULL IND DCS Covariates FULL IND DCS
X1 −0.018∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ X4X5 0.009 0.056 0.023∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.142) (0.009)
X 21 −0.00002 −0.00004 0.00005∗∗∗ X 25 0.0003 0.001 0.004
(0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.0002) (0.01) (0.003)
X2 −0.293∗∗∗ −0.245 −0.308 X6 −0.060∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.244) (0.271) (0.013) (0.057) (0.016)
X1X2 −0.0001 −0.0004 0.008∗∗∗ X1X6 0.0002 −0.00005 0.0002∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001)
X 22 −0.057∗∗∗ 0.020 −0.958∗∗∗ X2X6 0.005∗∗ 0.016 −0.008
(0.007) (0.017) (0.097) (0.002) (0.010) (0.007)
X3 −0.020 0.091∗ −0.040∗ X3X6 −0.0001 −0.005 −0.0002
(0.014) (0.047) (0.023) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
X1X3 0.00005 −0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ X4X6 −0.0002 0.001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.005) (0.001)
X2X3 −0.005∗ −0.029 −0.025∗∗ X5X6 0.019∗∗∗ 0.058 0.017∗∗
(0.003) (0.019) (0.012) (0.006) (0.040) (0.007)
X 23 0.0002
∗ 0.0002 0.0001 X 26 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0001)
X4 −0.014 −0.084 −0.027∗∗ X7 0.018∗∗∗ −0.005 0.024∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.161) (0.014) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
X1X4 0.0001 −0.003∗ 0.0001 X1X7 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.00002
(0.0001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.00005)
X2X4 0.004
∗∗∗ −0.029 0.009 X2X7 −0.0001 0.0002 −0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.029) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
X3X4 −0.00001 −0.004 −0.0001 X3X7 0.0002 0.0001 −0.00001
(0.0001) (0.004) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003)
X 24 0.0001 −0.002 0.0002∗∗ X4X7 −0.0001 0.004∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗
(0.00004) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0001)
X5 −0.740∗∗∗ −1.600∗∗∗ −0.390 X5X7 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.007∗ −0.010∗∗
(0.178) (0.522) (0.298) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
X1X5 0.004 0.014
∗∗∗ −0.004 X6X7 −0.0002 0.0004 −0.001∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002)
X2X5 0.087 0.003 0.013 X
2
7 −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.00004 −0.00001
(0.055) (0.165) (0.202) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.0001)
X3X5 −0.004 0.031 0.010
(0.011) (0.035) (0.018)
Observations 2,352 624 1,728
Log Likelihood −993.626 −263.836 −487.513
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,057.253 597.673 1,045.027
X1: lagged openness, X2: lagged GDP growth, X3: lagged real money growth, X4: lagged
inflation, X5: pegged exchange regime dummy, X6: lagged CB asset to GDP, X7: lagged private
credit to GDP.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B2: Probit models for the full sample, industrial, and
developing countries
FULL IND DCS
Lagged Openness −0.010∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lagged GDP Growth −0.090∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.055) (0.016)
Lagged Money Growth 0.006∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.011) (0.001)
Lagged Inflation −0.003∗ 0.022 −0.003∗
(0.002) (0.017) (0.002)
Pegged Exchange Regime −0.402∗∗∗ −0.159 −0.472∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.114) (0.068)
Lagged CB Assets 0.002 −0.015 0.004∗
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002)
Lagged Credit Deposit 0.008∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 2,352 624 1,728
Log Likelihood −1,165.593 −328.671 −821.601
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,345.186 671.342 1,657.201
The dependent variable is the targeting dummy, which has the value 1 if the
country adopts inflation targeting.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Index Propensity Scores with Conventional and Contemporaneous
Covariates
Tables B3 presents the findings of the first stage using the single index model when the
lagged openness coefficients are normalized to one. The sign of lagged GDP growth, lagged
inflation, and pegged exchange regime coefficients are similar to the main results in Table 2.
Higher GDP growth lowers the probability of the IT adoption. Also, it is less likely that the
country with a pegged exchange rate regime adopts inflation targeting. However, using the
conventional covariates provides different results on the real money growth. We find the higher
the real money growth the higher the likelihood of the IT adoption. The finding contrasts with
the results in Table 2.
Table B3: Single index models with the conventional variables
FULL IND DCS
Lagged GDP Growth -0.698∗∗∗ -1.413∗∗∗ -0.437∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.424) (0.082)
Lagged Money Growth 0.016∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.012) (0.002)
Lagged Inflation -0.137∗∗∗ -0.927∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.233) (0.012)
Pegged Exchange Regime -0.172 0.47 -0.439∗∗∗
(0.342) (0.427) (0.150)
The dependent variable is the targeting dummy, which has the value 1
if the country adopts inflation targeting.
Lagged openness is normalized to one for the identification in the single
index model.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table B4 summarizes the first stage estimations using the single index model with
contemporaneous variables.
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Table B4: Single index models with the contemporaneous
covariates
FULL IND DCS
GDP Growth 0.052 0.093 -0.508∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.939) (0.049)
Money Growth -0.066∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.03) (0.003)
Lagged Inflation 0.149∗∗∗ -0.578 -0.189∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.651) (0.006)
Pegged Exchange Regime -0.99∗ -2.512 -0.735∗∗
(0.579) (2.517) (0.337)
Credit Deposit 0.098∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.018) (0.006)
CB Assets 0.201∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.174) ( 0.012)
The dependent variable is the targeting dummy, which has the value 1
if the country adopts inflation targeting.
The lagged openness coefficient is normalized to one.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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The Pre-Crisis Period
Table B5 summarizes the results of the first stage using conventional and contemporaneous
variables for the pre-crisis period. We exclude the lagged central bank assets ratio and the
lagged credit deposit-GDP ratio.
Table B5: Single index models with the conventional and contemporaneous covariates, (pre-crisis
periods)
FULL IND DCS FULL IND DCS
Lagged GDP Growth -1.752∗∗∗ -0.987 -0.48∗∗ -2.558∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗
(0.357) (1.029) (0.201) (0.204) (0.129) (0.128)
Lagged Money Growth 0.053∗∗∗ -0.872∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.046∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.132) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005)
Lagged Inflation 0.101∗∗∗ -0.916∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗ 0.019 0.005 -0.001
(0.047) (0.276) (0.023) (0.033) (0.045) (0.019)
Pegged Exchange Regime -1.973∗∗∗ 0.141 -1.911∗∗∗ -0.66 -0.783∗∗∗ -1.211∗∗∗
(0.566) (0.753) (0.402) (0.592) (0.168) (0.409)
Lagged CB Assets 0.047∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.003) (0.001)
Lagged Credit Deposit 0.072 -0.008 -0.175∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.026) (0.001)
The dependent variable is the targeting dummy, which has the value 1 if the country adopts inflation targeting.
The lagged openness coefficient is normalized to one.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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